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RECENT ADDRESSES
GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION*
BY C. R.

SMITH

President, American Airlines, Inc.

T

HE members of this association and all other citizens have a primary
interest in making sure that transportation is prepared, now and at all
times in the future, to shoulder its part of the responsibility for national
defense. I would like to talk with you about the civil air fleet and about
its integration with the national defense program. I would like to speak
briefly about military air transportation. But, the principal purpose of this
discussion is to make the point that the maintenance of strong civilian air
lines is the best way to provide reserve air transportation capacity for
wartime requirements, and to urge that government policy have that
objective.
The nation's air transportation system and fleet must be developed with
a dual objective; to provide civilian air transportation service in time of
peace and to share the necessary defense obligations in time of war. That
dual objective must be a positive factor in government policy, for the
reason that cumulative experience supports the conclusion that a high
proportion of the air transportation capacity needed for national defense
can be provided, on the most economical and the most effective basis, by a
strong civilian air line system.
Air transportation capacity of real military value is capacity in being organized and ready for operation before hostilities. Airplanes to be
constructed after hostilities start may have little effect on the outcome of
another war. We had no long-range air transport reserve at the beginning
of the last war; we had to build our fleet during the war. Time for that
will not be available again.
The air line fleet is a strong fleet. At the end of 1954 the United States
air lines will be operating more than 1,300 transport aircraft, an increase
in number of more than 200% from the 415 aircraft in service on July 15,
1945. But more important-when we assess their potential military value629 of the 1,800 airplanes will be four-engined, long-range aircraft . . .
629 long-range aircraft at December 31, 1954, compared with 14 long-range
aircraft in the civilian fleet on July 15, 1945; a remarkable record of progress
and increased strength.
The number of nonstop coast-to-coast schedules operated by the domestic
air lines in 1954, and the increasing distances flown by the overseas carriers,
indicate the ability of this modern air fleet to move men and material over
long distances without intermediate landings for fuel. From a military
standpoint, the increased efficiency of the new aircraft is as important as
the increase in number.
Three hundred of the 629 long-range transports are formally dedicated
to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, organized under the national defense program
by the United States Air Force and the air lines. The program has the
objective that the entire capacity of this allocated fleet will be available
within 48 hours in the event of war. A higher proportion of the total fleet
can be devoted to that purpose in event of greater need.
* Address before The National Defense Transportation Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1954.
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MILITARY AIR TRANSPORTATION

According to the record as I know it, the relative progress of military
air transportation since the war is less encouraging; the order of priority
for air transportation in the military budget has not been high. At the
end of the war, with its experiences and lessons fresh in our minds, we
hoped we would soon have a military program which would include:
1. An aggressive program for the development of more efficient
power plants, especially designed for the needs of long-range
transportation. Progress in this field has been disappointing.
There are a few aircraft in the service equipped with turbinepropellor engines, but none, so far as I know, in the day-to-day
operation. We very much need a high-efficiency turbo-prop
power plant of modern design and in production.
2. A similar program for the development of more efficient aircraft
types, built around better power plants, to provide maximum
range, economy and load-carrying capacity. The military transport types which have been developed are not impressive;
3. The retirement of obsolete types from the military fleet, with
modern replacement. Some of this has been done, but too high
a proportion of the fleet is still of obsolete types.
The military services are constantly faced with a multitude of urgent
requirements, and it is difficult for an outsider to be sure about the priority
which an individual requirement should have. But certainly it is fair to say
that the rate of progress has been much less than we have expected. Air
transportation should have better attention in the military program.
CIVIL AIR POLICY

Strong civilian air lines are essential to the national economy and to
the national security. What government policies will reasonably assure
that?
For twenty-five years it has been the policy of the United States to
encourage and aid the development of civil aviation, for good reasons of
national interest. That policy was last stated in the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938. The growth of civil aviation under the wise provisions of that
Act has provided the keystone for the imposing structure of civil aviation
of today. The policies of the Civil Aeronautics Act were sound and
sufficient for 1938. But fifteen years have since intervened; fifteen years
of technical progress and of good economic opportunity. Do these policies
and their administration fit adequately the situation of 1954?
As an aid in that evaluation, we have welcomed a statement of policy
prepared by the Air Coordinating Committee and approved in principal
by the President, May, 1954.1 The President said then: "The committee
has accomplished this task in a fashion which could make its report a
milestone in the progress of American aviation." That can be so, if the
principal policies of this report can and will become a part of the day-to-day
administrative policies of the Federal regulatory agency.
About civil air transportation the report says this: "The goal of Federal
policies should at this time be directed to the development of economically
healthy carriers capable of financing with private resources their own
continuing growth."
In my opinion, the principal trunk line carriers demonstrated the ability
to be self-sustaining some years ago. With sound policy and regulation,
they will continue to do so. For the trunk line industry as a whole, without
I See, 21 JRL. AIR LAW & COM. 212 (1954).
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individual exception, that goal is a possibility which may lie immediately
ahead. For the overseas carriers and the local service carriers, the prospect
for self-sustaining status, without government air, is more distant.
Overseas Air Carriers
The history of United States maritime operation provides good reason
for the conclusion that United States participation in overseas air operations
can be continued only with subsidy support. The basic conditions of overseas
transportation, surface and air, are similar. You are familiar with the
details of the similarity. We cannot plan that our overseas air transportation
will soon be self-sustaining. We should be able to plan that the total of
necessary subsidy can be very much reduced, and that this can be done in
the near future.
We have made some mistakes in our policy for overseas air transportation. One of them is that we have subsidized United States carriers to
compete directly with each other, often on similar or identical routes, while
at the same time they have met the competition of foreign flag operators.
This policy has proven to be wasteful. Looking back it seems sensible
to conclude that it has provided few benefits. We would be better off had
we never started on that basis. But that is history; the job ahead is to have
a system which will produce a better result.
The policy urged by the committee, involving the elimination of wasteful
duplication, has been attacked as being one which will lead to monopoly and
to the "Chosen Instrument." Certainly, if it is made effective, it will lead
in some cases to the designation of a single United States carrier on an
individual route, for that is the sense of the recommendation.
However, I find no support in the language of the report for a conclusion
that a world-wide "Chosen Instrument" for United States overseas air
commerce has now or will have government support. The effort to sanction
a "Chosen Instrument" was laid to rest by the Congress and Federal Government many years ago, and I believe it impossible to revive.
I do believe that one criticism of this section of the report is warranted:
The report says that the existing system should not be continued, but it
does not spell out clearly the alternative system which it would recommend.
That undefined area leaves the report open to the suspicion that the "Chosen
Instrument" might be an alternative. That, I believe, is not the intention
of the committee. To allay that fear, the committee should finish its job,
saying specifically what it is "for" as well as what is "against" in the
organization of overseas air routes for the United States.
Local Service Air Lines
I cannot agree entirely with the recommendation of the report about
the disposition of the local service air lines, and I believe that it will find
little support among the communities served by the local carriers. The
report does not directly recommend that the local service air lines should be
taken over and operated by the trunk air lines, but the tenor and language
of the discussion seems to justify a conclusion that this is the intention.
And I believe it is the interpretation of the average local service carrier that
this end result may be in prospect for it, if the recommendation of the
Report should be accepted.
Based on cumulative experience these conclusions seem justified:
1. Local air service will continue to operate, for in principal part
it is reasonably required by public convenience and necessity;
2. Local air service, even with the utmost of economy, cannot now
be self-sustaining;
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3. There is no proof that local air service can be provided more
economically by the trunk lines than by the local service
specialists;
4. There is no proof of benefit in transferring the loss of local
service operation from one segment of the industry to another;
5. There will be no local service of consequence unless there continues to be some government aid;
6. For the time being at least the best policy is to continue the
local air services on an independent basis.
It is no news, of course, that local air service cannot continue without
some government aid. That was well-known and recognized at the time
the local service carriers were certificated. How long it would take to get
them on a self-sustaining basis was a matter of conjecture then, and it
remains so today. But I believe that the progress which that part of the
industry has recorded gives reasonable hope that the subsidy can be substantially reduced in the next several years and ultimately at least the
stronger segments of the business can achieve self-sustaining status.
The local service carriers are well impressed with their responsibility
to operate with economy and to increase their revenues from sources other
than the government, and they are working diligently toward that end.
Instead of wiping out the local service industry we would be better advised
to aid them in discovering other methods which will increase their selfreliance. Several very tangible recommendations in that area have been
advanced in this report and they will receive the attention which they
deserve, on the part of the carriers and on the part of the regulatory agency.
There are many hopeful signs that the local service carriers are going in
the right direction. They should be encouraged to continue and their
opportunity should not be foreclosed.
The Trunk Air Lines
The report recommends: "Plans should be developed for the consolidation of trunklines into a more limited number of systems, capable of selfsufficient operation-."
The objective of this recommendation is that trunk line operation shall
be free of subsidy, now and in the future. This recommendation presupposes
that the total of trunk air line service in the United States can be operated
with profit, without mail subsidy and without delay, if the total of the trunk
line routes and services are merged into logical operating systems.
That can be done, and I am of the opinion that most of those in the
industry believe it should be done. You cannot successfully dispute the
implied conclusion of the report: that the total of trunk line service in the
United States can be self-supporting, if all of the routes and services are
merged into logical operating systems.
Then, you are entitled to ask, why is that not being done? It is not being
done for the reason that the Civil Aeronautics Board seems inclined to
guarantee the continued existence and solvency of individual corporate
carriers. It is not being done for the reason that such a policy removes the
usual economic justification for merger.
Corporate consolidations come about through agreement by the owners,
the stockholders, that there is good reason-usually good economic reason
-for merger. However, if the Civil Aeronautics Board administers the
subsidy provision of the Act as a government guarantee for the continued
existence of individual corporations there is little reason for the owners
either to propose or to consider merger of their property.
The report says this: "The government's main interest in subsidizing
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air transportation is to assure service adequate for the public and national
interests rather than to preserve any individual carrier."
That it was the intention of Congress that this policy should prevail
seems quite clear. Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, popularly
known as the "need" section of the Act, says: "and the need of each such
air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to
insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenues
of the air carrier to enable such air carrier under honest, economical and
efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air
transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required for
the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service and the National
defense." The emphasis is my own.
The constant reiteration of "the air carrier" and "such air carrier" in
this section has been taken by some to mean that Congress intended to
guarantee the continued existence and solvency of individual air carriers.
But that position falls flat when it is considered that no subsidy is to be
paid except where it is proved that the service to be subsidized is required
by the national interest at the time the subsidy is paid. There seems to be
a growing tendency in government to apply that provision as though it
said that a subsidy should be paid to any needy carrier that holds a certificate
of convenience and necessity, regardless of whether the subsidized service
is required by the national interest, unless it is shown that the need arises
from dishonesty or from uneconomical or inefficient management. Such an
application would ignore the most important phrase in the subsidy section
of the statute and attribute an absurd intention to Congress.
Certainly Congress never intended that airline management was to have
its mistakes underwritten by the taxpayer short of a positive showing of
dishonesty or inefficiency, faults which are often difficult to prove. All that
the Act said, and all that it meant, was that only so long as, and only to
the extent that, a particular service is required by a definite showing of
public interest will the taxpayer be expected to step in and aid when
necessary. Under the law as written by Congress, is there any possible
justification for subsidizing individual corporations in the trunk line industry if the total of trunk line routes and services can be operated with profit,
without subsidy, if properly arranged into logical systems by merger?
The conclusion of the Committee, that the total of trunk line air service
requires no subsidy, cannot be disputed. A re-statement of that premise
might be this:
1. The domestic trunk air line system can be self-supporting if the
total of the routes and services are merged on a logical basis;
2. The necessary mergers will not come about if the "need" section
of the Civil Aeronautics Act is to be interpreted as a guarantee
of the continued existence and solvency of individual corporations;
3. Either the "need" section of the Act should be interpreted and
administered in keeping with the evident intention of Congress,
or else the "need" section of the Act should be amended by Congress so as to be inapplicable to domestic trunk airlines.
That policy would provide a new standard of management efficiency; it
would improve the quality of the public service, and it would result in
substantial savings to the government.
SUMMARY

In essence, this report of the Air Coordinating Committee seems to me
to say: The government of the United States, in the national interest, has

